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175 Chao and Yen kingdoms. The line of the first
712 Great Wall of China, built by hundreds of
131 thousands of conscripted laborers, included more of the steppe region of Inner Mongolia and southwestern Manchuria than the last Great Wall constructed under the Ming Dynasty (1368 to 1644). This last frontier barrier in its eastern extensions largely coincided with the northern boundaries of Shansi and Hopei before the Japanese invasion of China in 1937. Other dynastic rulers of China up to the end of the imperial period (1912) have rebuilt and maintained the Great Wall along or between its
175 original and final extensions.[6] For all the
131 emperors, the reason for the existence of the
184 wall was the same: It was an attempt to
563 establish and maintain a line of demarcation between the settled Chinese peoples and the nomadic "barbarians."

563 The line of demarcation was never
311 definitely settled. Judging by the changes in the borders of the North China Region, the problem of establishing a true boundary between the "Han Chinese" and what are now called ethnic minorities still has not been solved. The continued existence of the problem arises

6. See map in Lattimore, op. cit., p. 336.

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563 from the fact that arable land suited to the
311 Chinese type of agriculture only gradually shades off into steppe land not suitable for farming.

175 The northern portions of Shansi (above
131 Taiyuan) and of Hopei (above Peking) are part
563 of this marginal zone. Unstable politically
184 and culturally, this area and its inhabitants were drawn toward the tribal culture of the steppes when it was on the rise or toward the imperial system of China proper when it was strong and united. The area was also a primary training ground in the Chinese way of life for nomads drawn, pushed, or invited into China as well as a Chinese staging area for campaigns of conquest in the steppe regions of Central and northern Asia. So marginal and politically unstable is northern Shansi that its upper and lower borders have at different times been included in the main line of the Great Wall, resulting in the encompassment of northern Shansi by remains of the frontier barrier. The frontier struggle began with the establishment of the first stable Chinese empire under the Han Dynasty (221 B.C. to A.D. 220) and lasted until at least the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.[7]

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7. Lattimore, op. cit., develops the thesis of the origin, nature, and consequences of the frontier conflict.

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175 remarkable and earned for himself a place with posterity second to none among China's many rulers. He dispelled the menace of the Turks on the northern frontier, pushed Chinese hegemony into Central Asia, and reorganized the empire and its administration. His work initiated an era of unsurpassed excellence in Chinese art and literature and of cultural and commercial contact with the rest of the world.

D. Nomad Occupation of North China

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184 For most of the fourth through sixth centuries and the tenth through thirteenth centuries, Hopei and Shansi were under nomad dominance while the South was experiencing great cultural advances under Chinese rulers.[9]

9. The best accounts of the nomadic conquest and rule of North China are: Eberhard, op. cit., pp. 110-77, 207-39; Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1952, pp. 64-120; and Karl A. Wittfogel, Feng Chia-sheng, et al, History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125), issued as Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s. 36, 1946, Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1949.

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175 The periods of division have led to some
563 differences between North and South in dress,
184 spoken language, and habits of daily life. Also, the long centures of partition have developed a consciousness within North and South of their separate identities and some antagonism between the two regions which has never been eradicated.

These differences should not be too much stressed, however. Sufficient numbers of the old families stayed in the North to fill most of the administrative jobs under the alien rule and instill Chinese values and forms of organization in the conquerors. By intermarriage and cultural conformity, the nomad peoples have been so thoroughly assimilated by the conquered Chinese that today there is no trace of the separate strains of Tiebtan, Manchu, Hun, Turkish, or Mongol invaders who overran North China and settled there.

E. The Alien Dynasties

175 Only twice have the nomad invaders of North China extended their dominance over the whole country. The Mongols who had conquered North China by 1260 ruled all China as the Yüan Dynasty from 1279 to 1368. The Manchus, entering by way of Peking, dominated all China as the Ch'ing Dynasty from 1644 to 1912.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1h,
Sociological Background

SOCIAL VALUES AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

I. CUSTOMS AND CHARACTERISTIC WAYS OF LIFE

●184 The Chinese imperial system was strikingly successful in fostering common basic attitudes among the peoples which it absorbed within its ever-widening sphere. Nevertheless local and regional sub-cultures, brought into the imperial order at different times throughout more than two millenia, did not lose all of their characteristic traits. The oldest center of "Chinese" civilization was in the fertile plain of the lower Yellow River valley. When, in the course of centuries, areas as diverse as the loess highlands of Shansi and the warm rich lowlands of the Yangtze were brought into the orbit of Chinese civilization, differences in climate, terrain, and folk culture meant that each of these areas preserved a degree of cultural distinctiveness. For example, the loess highlands made it possible for substantial numbers of people in Shensi and Shansi to live in man-made caves, while this kind of dwelling was unknown on the Yellow River plain.

241 At the same time there are factors which give to the area we are now considering important uniformities in culture. The expansion of "Chinese culture" from Southern Hopei Honan

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1r,
Sociological Background

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

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The attitudes of an individual, although conditioned by the environment in which he lives and influenced by the persons with whom he comes in contact, are subject to changes that are wellnigh unpredictable; he may simultaneously adopt diametrically opposed attitudes without being aware of inconsistency. This fact, coupled with China's multitudinous regions and groups of people of varying characteristics, makes the task of gauging the attitudes of the Chinese people an exceedingly risky one at best. The Chinese, in general, are traditionally less outspoken than Americans. However, since attitudes manifest themselves in reactions and some of the reactions of the Chinese people are observable even in official Communist announcements, a few very general and broad conclusions may be drawn. In this discussion, attention is focused on the attitudes of the various groups of Chinese toward their country, the Communist government, and the ambitions and aspirations of the individual.

In sociological studies, occupational stratification is one recognized criterion for analyzing any society. In adopting this approach for our discussion, we do not propose to overlook the significance of grouping people according to other equally valid criteria, such as age, sex, and income. Older people, for example, are generally

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more conservative, less willing to adapt to change, and less likely to show enthusiasm for the Communist program. The rich, who have more to lose, are generally more dissatisfied with the Communist regime than their poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across the occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, occupational stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

I. FARMERS

The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with that of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with those of rich merchants, are all but non-existent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists chiefly of poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. However, since the Communists redesignated Peking as the capital and North China once again resumed its role as the most important region in China's cultural and political affairs, the farmers in this region are likely to be more aware of the existence of a community greater than their immediate environs. All the farmers in North China speak Northern Mandarin, which makes them feel quite at home in Peking. Thus they are more concerned with life in Peking than are those farmers in remote southwestern or south-

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565 eastern areas. In those villages in North China
184 which were overrun by the Japanese during World War II, the growth of a spirit of nationalism is even more noticeable.

The Communist began to "educate and propagandize" the farmers in North China before those in the East China, Central-South, and Southwest region. There are probably more farmers in this region who have mastered a few political terms. Of course, this does not mean that the farmers have developed a strong national feeling. But, compared with other regions, North China has had a longer period of Communist rule, and the farmers in this region have been exposed to more opportunities of Communist indoctrination, a part of which is to foster a spirit of nationalism.

The idea that he is soon to be given land probably has generated apprehension even in the poorest peasant, who always believed he wanted to own land. To be sure, the gain through the process of land reform must have given the poor peasant some satisfaction, but subsequent grain taxes remain heavy and Communist efforts to collectivize the production and marketing of farm produce met resistance. Although there are fewer reports on the farmers' expression of dissatisfaction in North China, there is reason to believe that the poor farmer in this region is less happy than he was in the days immediately after

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the completion of Communist land reform, especially if he had experienced the "softer" kind of Communism in northern Hopei and Shansi provinces during the latter part of World War II. In this connection it is worth noting that land reform was somewhat modified in North China and was carried out with much less violence. The possibility still exists that changes in government policy may regain for the regime some of the farmer's enthusiasm.

There has been a great deal of publicity for the flood control projects on the Yung-ting River in Hopei Province. Farmers who have received benefits from the projects are undoubtedly impressed by the accomplishment of the new regime but subsequent floods may have brought a great amount of disillusionment to these farmers. Others who have never directly profited by the projects will have more reason to be skeptical. Available reports show that neither the government nor the farmers are satisfied with the amount of relief and welfare work done thus far or with the manner in which this work is done. These reports were substantiated by the fact that the authorities in Tientsin have had to initiate a campaign to send many peasants back to their villages, indicating that life in rural communities in North China still does not offer enough incentive for the farmers to stay with their farming. As a result farmers continue to flood metropolitan centers in search of work and a better living.

The Chinese farmer's picture of a foreign culture was originally derived from contact with

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foreign missionaries. At one time foreign churches were established in all important cities and many larger villages in North China. Government efforts to foster xenophobia, supported by the effort of the ultranationalistic segment of the Chinese elite dated from the late nineteenth century. These efforts have been intensified by the Communists, who are trying to create a frightening image of "Western imperialism" in the eyes of the farmers. Many farmers in this region are likely to remember the stories about the Boxer Rebellion which ran rampant in Hopei and Shansi and victimized many foreigners. Memory of such anti-foreign uprisings may cause these farmers to fall easy prey to Communist anti-Western propaganda. A very small number of farmers who have been less influenced by anti-foreign propaganda and who have received benefits from foreign missionaries may be disturbed by the deliberate mistreatment of missionaries. Other farmers who regard the missionaries as an undesirable group may approve the "foreign devils' downfall." But the majority of farmers have had little or no contact with foreigners; they are not particularly concerned with the latter's fate in Communist China.

The Chinese farmer has always hoped to safeguard his family by acquiring land to provide a better education for his children and to maintain the respect of fellow villagers. Now that the farmer can no longer obtain as much land as he hopes, he seeks ways in which his children through education, can advance on the socio-economic ladder. The fact that many young

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people from peasant families have been absorbed in the government "cadre" system may induce the Chinese farmer to look more kindly upon the present regime. Of course, there are exceptions among the farming population. Farmers active in secret societies, which are traditionally resistant to government control, may have an altogether different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. Mass uprisings, in which secret societies played an important part, indicate that sometimes these groups have distinctly anti-foreign or anti-authoritarian characteristics. Members of some of these groups may uphold a standard of loyalty to the individual above traditional loyalty to the family or to the state; others may condone banditry and defy all forms of established social order. Due to closer surveillance by the Communists in North China secret societies are much less active in this region than in other regions.

II. URBAN WORKERS

In an industrial city like Tientsin in North China, the group feeling of organized workers was aroused as early as the 1920's when labor was involved in many political movements. Many industrial workers have long realized that they were "in the group" and somewhat later came to the conclusion that they had to work "for the group" in those movements launched against foreign influence and private capital. Having been involved in these movements, the worker undoubtedly formed a more definite idea of the

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nation and its symbols than that of the average farmer.

The Communists' avowed attempt to raise the status of the worker must have given the worker a feeling of importance as he learns of the Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He derives a measure of pride of achievement when a steel plant is erected or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the new China. Other promised benefits, including job security and welfare provisions also add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, despite the fact that most of these "benefits" still largely remain promises. Especially in North China where the workers were the first to see a "cultural center" and other recreational facilities dedicated to the Chinese working class, the morale among the workers is expected to be higher than that of the workers in other regions.

On the liability side of the Communist policy toward the worker are: the lack of substantial rise in the standard of living; a harsher working schedule and loss of leisure time; and illusory welfare program, which the Communists themselves admit cannot be realized until the worker has worked still harder to produce still more; and the disillusionment that the "proletariat" has not really become the master of the new China as the Communists had promised. Thus the worker's attitude toward the government and its policy must depend on how much he believes in a glorious "tomorrow" and how well

565 he can put up with the physical hardships of
• 184 "today." The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against driving the workers too hard appear to indicate that the laboring class is showing signs of possible exhaustion. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new managerial class fostered by the Communists, which, for whatever reasons, receives better treatment than do those who work on the production line.

Foreign advisors had been employed in many factories in pre-Communist days, and many workers may have become accustomed to accepting the general excellence of Western technology. However, any government effort to impose foreign leadership in technical fields may injure the pride of the worker and provoke his resentment. Certainly the demoralizing effect of the privileged treatment accorded Russian technicians in Chinese factories should not be discounted.

There is little evidence that the Chinese worker has abandoned his aspiration of personal advancement in the material sense. Although here again the promotion of the young and ambitious to serve in the huge government machine may satisfy some of the workers, the lack of a substantial betterment in their standard of living will lead many workers to feel that their aspirations cannot be fulfilled under the Com-

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565 munist regime.

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III. STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS

517 184 Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

Although the attitudes of Chinese intellectual differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some at least the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of dignity and power. After five years of Communist rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified and become a nation of

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importance. But on the nagative side there are the restrictions on intellectual freedom imposed by the Communists. Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually substituting the freshly trained and well-indoctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a "liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a sense of insecurity among many.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in the government where they could attain wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals who still harbor such personal ambitions, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have not been able to do for many years in the past, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is undoubtedly a welcome move. However, it must be remembered that in an effort to place college graduates and other trained personnel where they are most needed, the Communist government has admitted misassignments which resulted in dissatisfaction.

Since the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, the Communists have always had enthusiastic support among the students.

517 184 Many loyal Communist cadres are recruited from among the students who, so far, have not shown any lack of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. But while accepting Communism as their ideal, the students may not be able to suppress entirely a simultaneous impulse toward individualism. Furthermore, they may also find the reality of Communism or the individual's place in it less exciting and idealistic than promised by Communist preachments.

IV. BUSINESSMEN AND INDUSTRIALISTS

565 184 Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-business men and manufacturers, who have made up the larger part of China's urban population, continue to exist, although in substantially reduced numbers. Commerce has always occupied an inferior position in traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new and its position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had operated under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sounding phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of the state could evoke sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese

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market and caused dislocation in the Chinese economy.

Under the Peking regime, businessmen and industrialists as a group fare badly (possibly not much better than rich landowners), and the general mood in industrial and commercial circles is most probably unfavorable toward the government. The Communists have made it clear that small businessmen and manufacturers are only tolerated in the transitional stage of the "New Democracy", and that there will be no room for private enterprise in the socialist society which is the ultimate goal of the Communist regime. Meanwhile, these people have to carry a large share of the tax burden and face the stiff competition of and regulation by state enterprises. There is evidence that the businessmen and manufacturers accustomed as they are to government interference are finding the controls imposed by the Communist government increasingly strict, making it ever more difficult to manipulate or elude restrictive measures. This general mood of discontent is particularly observable among merchants and private industrialists in Tientsin which has been allocated large portions of government bonds, second only to Shanghai in East China.

If profit has been the most common motive among businessmen and manufacturers, under the present circumstances they have been forced to abandon or at least restrain their ambitions. Some of those who were allowed to do so have made a second choice -- that of changing their

565 184 careers. The more adaptable have escaped the purges by cooperating with the Communist regime. In this connection the Communists have appointed a number of erstwhile influential industrialists to serve in the government; it may be merely a conciliatory gesture of the Communists to win the support of small business, but it does provide this class of people with one temporary alternative to their lost hope.

An additional factor in provoking dissatisfaction among the merchants is the control on foreign trade. Merchants in north China seaports like Tangku and Chinwangtao, who had high hopes when the Nationalist blockade sealed off the rival port of Shanghai, are disillusioned because virtually all foreign trade is now handled by the government. Their role has been reduced to merely conducting limited export transactions supervised by the government, and there is no prospect that they may be allowed to import those Western manufactured goods which are highly profitable.

V. WOMEN

184 562 The customary position of women in China is subordinate to that of men. This tradition was so deep-rooted that it took superhuman courage for the first women to claim their "rights"; and the pain of "emancipation" continues under the Communists.

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To the "emancipated" belongs responsibility; this is at least theoretically true, and the Chinese women who have exchanged kitchen for factory are generally expected to have a degree of political consciousness and a love for labor similar to that of men of equal education and comparable environment. In many cases women prove to be even more "patriotic" than men as a result of the unprecedented government effort to show the women that they, too, can achieve enviable social recognition by a show of "patriotism" and devotion to labor.

How much improvement in the status of the women has been brought about by the Communists? Women are encouraged to participate in political activities and labor; more tangibly and closer to their daily life, they are given child care, adult education, and other welfare benefits if they join the working force. If the increase in number of women workers in factories can be taken as an indication of the women's own free choice, then women in Communist China may indeed feel favorably disposed toward the Communist regime. But upon closer observation this may not be the case; many women who undertook factory work after 1949 may have done so as a financial necessity rather than as a result of free choice.

The much-publicized marriage law in Communist China embodies nothing new, but its vigorous and often arbitrary enforcement is

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unprecedented. It has engendered mixed feelings among the women. Acceptance of this law will mean the destruction of some of the most stubborn traditions in China (See discussion of the marriage law in the chapter on The Family).

Some women hold high posts in government, and there are "labor heroines" in all industries. Housewives in larger cities manage to live in leisure if they belong to the high income group. Younger housewives in families of modest income may have to work outside the home, but there is no indication that they resent it. The age-group differential asserts itself in the reaction of women to the new regime; older women who had learned to live in peace with the extended family system are apt to dread the Communist effort to reduce the extended family to the conjugal family; young women are more likely to feel favorably disposed toward the Peking regime.

A sharp difference in attitude is to be observed between the women in Peking and those in the mountains of southeastern Shansi Province. City life, plus opportunity to receive education, had caused changes in attitudes among women in urban areas even before the Communists announced their policy with regard to women and their status in society; while most of the women in outlying villages remain more strictly tradition-bound and are less prepared to accept the ideas introduced by the Peking government.

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VI. MINORITY NATIONALITIES

563 184 It can be said that there is no minority national group in the provinces of Hopei and Shansi. However, wherever such people are found in North China, no matter how few they are in number, the Communist government is making political capital by extending them favored treatment. The Mongols and Manchus in this region are so well assimilated by the Han Chinese that no line of distinction can be drawn between them. The H___ people, mainly because of their religion, are being given every recognition by the government in order to win support of all the members of Islamic faith within China and the sympathy of those in other countries. Although it is difficult to gauge how thoroughly the scattered Hui people in North China have been convinced of the Communists' good intentions, there is no basis to assume that they are not pleased with their priviledged position as a result of the regime's policy toward minority nationalities.

VII. OTHER GROUPS

184 665 647 In addition to the groups discussed, there are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes do have a significant bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily

184 665 647 have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibited intense feelings of patriotism and dedication to the "cause" in the early days of their careers, and so far they have shown no sign indicating that their feelings may have changed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, the downfall of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih in 1954 was the only serious rift in the Communist leadership. Even the Kao-Jao incident, which might have delayed repercussions in Northwest and East China, was quickly settled and left no perceptible political ripple in North China. A purge as violent as that which took place in Russia in the 1930's at present cannot as yet be predicted for China. Overshadowed by the unique personal prestige and cohesive power of Mao Tse-tung, the high-ranking Communist leaders, particularly the military, have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrupting Party harmony and hegemony. This, of course, does not preclude future development of discord among Party leaders.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to prove their loyalty to Communism. The fact that the Party relies on close surveillance and an atmosphere of fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction

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184 665 647 and dissidence within the Party ranks. Expansion of industrial centers in China necessitates the promotion of numerous lower-level Party functionaries. This certainly tends to make the old Party cadres resentful when they see the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for advancement, and the amenities of a wider social life.

Former Nationalist officials had their darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. There is no doubt that these former Kuomintang personnel are reminded of the necessity of proving their thorough conversion to Communism. A sense of insecurity affects this group more virulently than it does the "securely situated" segments of the Chinese population.

VIII. CONCLUSION

184 The Communist system of multiple control, which penetrates all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with

184 Russia are two major causes of dissatisfaction among the Chinese people. Regimentation, when carried to the extreme, provokes the resistance of the people. Subservience to the Soviet destroys the spirit of nationalism which the Communists have been trying to cultivate in China. There is evidence that Peking is attempting to reduce the possibility of friction between the Russians and the Chinese without damaging the ideological kinship and the diplomatic relationship between China and the Soviet Union. The activities of the wide-spread Sino-Russian Friendship Association and the continual propaganda on Russian aid to Communist China indicate a sustained effort to create a favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union.

The general patterns of attitudes we have discussed can serve only as indications of the prevailing social mood among various groups. Sociologists agree that it is difficult to predict group response. This, it appears, must apply to a study of a people so varied in temperament as the Chinese.